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The mission of the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC)—created in 1969 
through an amendment to the Foreign As-
sistance Act—is “to mobilize and facilitate 
the participation of United States private 
capital and skills in the economic and so-
cial development of less developed coun-
tries and areas, and countries in transi-
tion from nonmarket to market economies, 
thereby  complementing  the  development 
assistance objectives of the United States.” 
OPIC  pursues  this  mission  by  insuring 
US  investors  against  political  risks  that 
include expropriation, currency inconvert-
ibility, and political violence; by financing 
US investors overseas through loans and 
loan guarantees; and by providing credits 
to private investment funds that make eq-
uity investments in businesses in under-
developed countries and regions.
Over  its  34-year  history,  OPIC  has 
supported  $145  billion  worth  of  invest-
ments that have helped developing coun-
tries generate over $11 billion in host-gov-
ernment revenues and create over 680,000 
host-country jobs. OPIC projects have also 
generated  $65  billion  in  US  exports  and 
created more than 254,000 American jobs. 
During the past five years, OPIC’s loan and 
insurance programs have encompassed an 
average of 45 projects per year with a value 
of $2.5 billion, in a total of approximately 
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With the advent of George W. Bush’s adminis-
tration, the new leadership at OPIC has refocused 
the Corporation on its original mission of facilitat-
ing economic development, with a determination to 
complement rather than compete with the private 
sector.  This  presents  a  timely  opportunity  for  a 
thorough  review  of  the  rationale  for  OPIC’s  exis-
tence, and for a rigorous examination of recurrent 
criticisms that it is merely duplicating activities that 
can be better handled by the private sector. We con-
clude that OPIC has an indispensable role to play 
in overcoming market failures that limit the flow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing coun-
tries—a role that private actors cannot replicate on 
their own.
OPIC  needs  new  and  expanded  statutory  au-
thority from Congress, however, to be able to real-
ize its full potential to contribute to the growth and 
welfare of developing countries and to the health of 
the US home economy. Under statutory constraints 
now in place, many of the projects that can have 
the largest catalytic effect on host country develop-
ment are ineligible for OPIC coverage. In addition, 
OPIC’s creation and application of a new develop-
mental matrix will allow it to pay more attention to 
the broader social aspects of its projects (the “sus-
tainable  development”  agenda),  and  the  adoption 
of current best practices will help OPIC to provide 
greater transparency about workers’ rights and en-
vironmental practices of the investors the Corpora-
tion supports.
The impact that OPIC can have in supporting 
the flow of FDI to developing countries, while en-
suring that its operations strengthen the job base 
in the United States, can be greatly magnified by 
reforms—few in  number  but  significant  in  conse-
quence—outlined in this policy brief. To make this 
case, however, requires looking at how OPIC now 
functions and at how its practices and procedures 
might be modified and made more effective. 
A Rigorous Public Policy Rationale for OPIC
When  OPIC was  founded  in  1969  through  an 
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, the flow 
of FDI to the developing world was relatively small, 
long-term lending to foreign investors in emerging 
markets was extremely rare, and insurance cover-
age against the variety of political risks encountered 
by international companies was virtually nonexis-
tent. Today, then, why should the US government—
and the US taxpayer—want to continue to support 
an agency such as OPIC in the midst of vigorous 
private-sector  political risk  insurers  and  financial 
institutions helping foreign investors to operate in 
emerging markets?
The answer depends upon whether there are eco-
nomic and political benefits for the recipient coun-
tries and for the US home economy as well as for 
broad US foreign policy interests, that result from 
supporting  FDI  beyond  those  that  accrue  to  the 
private parties involved—that is, positive externali-
ties for both the developing world and for the United 
States. And the answer also depends upon identify-
ing market failures that would limit or prevent these 
benefits from being generated if private-sector po-
litical risk insurers and financial institutions were 
left to function on their own.
There is abundant evidence that appropriately 
structured  foreign  investor  operations  can  con-
tribute  to  economic  growth,  social  welfare,  good 
governance,  and  environmentally  sustainable  de-
velopment around the world. OPIC must be allowed 
to provide political risk insurance coverage to those 
projects whose beneficial impact on the host econo-
my is likely to be largest, rather than prohibited from 
doing so. Although FDI is by no means a cure-all 
for the problems of poverty and underdevelopment, 
these  positive  results—when  they  occur—provide 
important commercial and political feedback to the 
United States and may reinforce foreign policy ob-
jectives by helping to stabilize or reconstruct crisis 
areas, such as Central America in the 1990s, or Af-
OPIC needs new and expanded statutory 
authority from Congress to be able
 to realize its full potential to contribute 
to the growth and welfare of developing 
countries and to the health of the 
US home economy.
OPIC must be allowed to provide political 
risk insurance coverage to those projects 
whose beneficial impact on the host 
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ghanistan, the Balkans, and Pakistan in the current 
period. Support for outward investment can also ex-
pand US exports, improve the level of US wages and 
benefits, and generate other favorable spillovers for 
the US home economy.
Not  all  foreign  investment  projects,  however, 
contribute to economic growth, social welfare, good 
governance, or environmentally sustainable devel-
opment in the host country, or strengthen the US 
economic base at home. The justification for public 
support for FDI hinges therefore on separating out 
those projects that provide a positive contribution 
from those that do not, or on transforming the latter 
into the former.
But why is a publicly backed institution such as 
OPIC needed at all to support and guide the flow of 
FDI? Could not private political risk insurers and fi-
nancial institutions provide the assistance investors 
need on their own?
OPIC plays a role that private political risk in-
surers and financial institutions cannot duplicate, 
by deterring host authorities from taking political 
actions  that  damage  foreign  investor  operations. 
Private political risk insurers offer the promise of 
compensation  after  harmful  acts  take  place.  So 
does  OPIC.  But  OPIC  has  a  unique  capability  to 
prevent the host country from engaging in behavior 
that leads to a demand for compensation, because 
its insurance coverage and financial guarantees are 
backed by investment agreements with the coun-
tries  where  it  operates  and  are  reinforced  by  the 
clout  of  the  US  government.  Therefore,  OPIC can 
discourage  adverse  conduct  from  taking  place  in 
the first place or help resolve disputes before they 
result in a claim.
OPIC  provides  an  umbrella  of  protection  that 
helps make up for a market failure in the ability of 
host countries to make long-term commitments to 
honor contracts, after large amounts of foreign capi-
tal have been sunk and host authorities—or succes-
sor governments—find themselves under domestic 
pressure to change, tighten, or abrogate the initial 
investment  agreement.  The  OPIC  “presence”  thus 
allows foreign investment projects to move forward 
that otherwise would never be launched. When in-
vestment disputes are not checked or averted, OPIC 
has successfully pursued recovery on more than 90 
percent of the claims. As a result, OPIC has operat-
ed for more than three decades on a self-sustaining 
basis, accumulating about $4.2 billion in reserves.
But if OPIC can make a profit from its opera-
tions, should it not be privatized? The rationale for 
OPIC’s  existence  is  not  contingent  upon  whether 
selling political risk insurance can yield a profit, but 
rather springs from its role in overcoming market 
failure in ways private-sector actors cannot. A study 
of potential privatization of OPIC commissioned from 
JP Morgan in 1996 concluded that the US govern-
ment would actually have to offer OPIC’s assets at a 
discount to induce any private corporation to take 
over its portfolio, because the private sector would 
simply not be able to replicate its deterrent function 
or reproduce its recovery rate. The study pointed 
out that even with a hypothetical privatization, the 
US government would still have to promise to back 
all outstanding contracts until their expiration pre-
cisely to maintain the umbrella of protection against 
host-country mistreatment that only an official US 
presence could supply.
In supporting foreign investment over the years, 
OPIC has regularly devoted the largest proportion 
of its financial guarantees and insurance to large 
corporations. Should not this concentration on big, 
established investors be considered a kind of “cor-
porate welfare”?
The answer to what kinds of corporations OPIC 
should  support  requires  assessing  what  kinds  of 
investors  can  best  promote  host-country  develop-
ment and generate the economic and political exter-
nalities that are in the public interest of the United 
States. Here the evidence points consistently toward 
larger  firms,  although,  sometimes,  smaller  firms 
can make important contributions too. Although it 
is important to assess how small and medium-sized 
enterprises can best be integrated into OPIC’s op-
erations, there is no empirical justification for criti-
cizing OPIC support for larger firms per se.
Complementing  Rather  Than  Competing  with 
the Private Sector
A  rigorous  justification  for  OPIC’s  support  of 
FDI still leaves the question of how it can maximize 
cooperation  and  minimize  competition  with  pri-
vate-sector insurers. Is OPIC doing enough to avoid 
taking away business that private insurers would 
like to provide without competition from a publicly 
backed entity?
Here there is an inescapable trade-off between 
OPIC’s developmental mission and its objective of 
The rationale for OPIC’s existence is not 
contingent upon whether selling political 
risk insurance can yield a profit, but rather 
springs from its role in overcoming market 
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offering as much business as possible to the private 
sector. The trade-off arises for investment projects 
“at  the  margin”  when  the  investor  insists  that  it 
cannot get what it needs at acceptable terms from 
private insurers and will not move forward without 
OPIC’s participation. OPIC could emphasize its de-
velopmental role and support the project as the cli-
ent requests, or it could emphasize its desire not to 
compete with the private sector and refuse to sup-
port the project.
In 2001, OPIC adopted a complementarity pro-
cedure designed to ensure that each and every new 
project submitted to OPIC is open to private insurer 
participation.  OPIC’s  insurance  officers  provide 
prospective customers with contact information for 
private insurers as well as brokers and request that 
they attempt to place at least 50 percent of their 
coverage with the private market. If placement with 
private carriers is not successful, potential custom-
ers are required to provide an explanation as to why 
terms, conditions, rates, or tenor are unacceptable. 
Only then will OPIC consider providing coverage re-
quested by the client. The ultimate assessment of 
how to insure a project resides with the client.
Thus, for projects “at the margin”—projects that 
investors would not launch if they were to have to 
accept  only  private-sector  insurance—OPIC  has 
properly left open the possibility of letting its devel-
opmental mission prevail, by maintaining the option 
of providing the requested coverage rather than cat-
egorically refusing to do so.
In addition to coinsurance with the private mar-
ket, reinsurance—in which OPIC offers part of its 
portfolio to private insurers or accepts part of the 
portfolio of private insurers—offers another mecha-
nism  for  increased  cooperation  with  the  private 
sector and also provides other important benefits. 
Should OPIC begin to offer some of its projects for 
reinsurance by private companies?
The  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  has 
sometimes  argued  that  because  the  US  Depart-
ment of the Treasury has a cheaper cost of capital, 
deeper pockets, and a greater ability to spread risk 
across all taxpayers than any other entity, the US 
government should reinsure itself and not pay fees 
to others. But this argument ignores the fact that 
reinsurance is simply a management tool that OPIC 
can use to enhance its developmental mission and 
support foreign policy objectives more effectively at 
crucial times.
If OPIC had the option of reinsuring part of its 
portfolio with the private market, it could structure 
its portfolio with more flexibility. For example, OPIC 
might  find  that  its  accumulation  of  exposures  in 
Turkey would make it imprudent for it to take on 
more risk there, yet US interests would be strongly 
served by supporting new projects in that country. 
If OPIC had the ability to transfer exposure to pri-
vate reinsurers that might be underrepresented in 
the Turkish market, it could support new projects 
that it otherwise could not.
Do  these  efforts  to  maximize  cooperation  and 
avoid taking away business from private-sector in-
surers pose hidden dangers to OPIC? The reinvigo-
rated impetus to maximize cooperation and avoid 
taking business away from private insurers exacer-
bates OPIC’s problems of adverse selection and lack 
of portfolio diversification. No insurance agency can 
long remain viable if it accepts only the sickest pa-
tients or the most vulnerable clients.
OPIC’s  initiative  to  turn  over  all  proposals 
brought to its door to potential private-sector cover-
age is synonymous with adverse selection: Private 
insurers will take over all of the more favorable proj-
ects and will carve out risky areas for coverage from 
the  less  favorable  projects.  OPIC  will  be  left  with 
the least desirable investments and the more risky 
areas of coverage. In this process, OPIC is likely to 
limit its ability to balance its portfolio across sec-
tors and geographical regions, as private insurers 
understandably leave less appealing projects to the 
public sector.
Adverse selection would be exacerbated if OPIC 
were to promise to pick up areas of coverage that 
private coinsurers dropped over the life of individ-
ual projects. The potential damage could be worse 
still if OPIC were to offer individual projects to be 
reinsured by the private market—or even perhaps 
be required to offer all projects for private reinsur-
ance—opening the door to cherry-picking from the 
OPIC portfolio by private reinsurers.
The challenge for OPIC is to revamp its 
screening and monitoring procedures to 
ensure a positive contribution along both 
these dimensions—augmenting host-
country development and strengthening 
the economic health and welfare of the US 
economy—while rejecting or restructuring 
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OPIC’s Impact on Home and Host Countries
OPIC’s support for US foreign investment can si-
multaneously have a positive impact on host coun-
tries in the developing world and on the US home 
economy.  But  not  all  foreign  investment  projects 
can be complacently assumed to have this doubly 
beneficial effect. The challenge for OPIC is to revamp 
its screening and monitoring procedures to ensure 
a  positive  contribution  along  both  these  dimen-
sions—augmenting host-country development and 
strengthening the economic health and welfare of 
the  US  economy—while  rejecting  or  restructuring 
projects that do not.
Looking first at the impact of OPIC-supported 
projects on economies in the developing world, the 
evidence suggests that the projects OPIC chooses 
to  support  can  have  a  much  more  potent  effect 
on  host-country  development  than  conventional 
measurements indicate. OPIC measures its devel-
opmental impact on host countries by estimating 
taxes,  local  expenditures,  local  employment,  and 
foreign exchange revenues from the projects it sup-
ports. Modern growth models suggest that if these 
inputs are all that OPIC-backed projects bring to 
the host economy, the outcome will remain far be-
low potential.
What foreign investors potentially can bring to 
emerging markets is not simply capital and technol-
ogy to put local labor to work but also “packages” 
of  technology,  quality  control  mechanisms,  and 
management and marketing techniques that allow 
host-economy actors to undertake entirely new ac-
tivities as well as carry out existing activities more 
efficiently.  These  packages  may  have  economic 
spillovers and externalities for the host society that 
extend well beyond purely economic effects.
New  estimates  of  the  economic  benefits  from 
such  foreign  investment  packages  are  10  to  20 
times larger than the measurement categories OPIC 
now employs would suggest. These positive effects 
on development are most likely to be found in ex-
port-oriented manufacturing projects that are closely 
integrated  into  the  parent  corporation’s  sourcing 
network—precisely the kinds of projects that OPIC 
resolutely turns away from, under current internal 
guidelines and externally legislated restrictions that 
must be changed.
The potential benefits of OPIC-supported proj-
ects also include social spillovers and externalities, 
in the form of changes in worker-management in-
stitutions, wage and benefit policies, on-the-job and 
outside training programs, and gender issues such 
as nondiscrimination in compensation and promo-
tion, nonharassment policies, maternity leave, and 
access to day care. These social spillovers and ex-
ternalities can include improvements in corporate 
governance  and  support  for  host-country  policy 
reform.
But these economic and social benefits are not 
present—indeed  are  noticeably  lacking—in  many 
foreign investor operations. As part of an effort to 
ensure sustainable development from the projects it 
supports, OPIC must redirect and expand its moni-
toring protocols to focus on this broader array of 
effects, both positive and negative.
These potentially positive effects on emerging-
market countries need not come at the expense of 
the strength and vitality of economic activity in the 
home country. In the aggregate, the evidence con-
sistently shows that there is a win-win relationship 
between support for outward investment and ben-
eficial consequences for the US economy. US firms 
that invest abroad simultaneously export more from 
the United States, pay higher wages and benefits at 
home, enjoy greater stability in the domestic mar-
ket, and generate more significant spillovers and ex-
ternalities for the firms, workers, and communities 
where they are located than do similar US firms that 
are  not  engaged  in  outward  investment.  Keeping 
firms at home—or denying them help to overcome 
market failures in moving abroad—would leave the 
US economy worse off than when they are able to 
take advantage of opportunities around the world.
Once again, however, this complementarity be-
tween  outward  investment  and  expanded  exports 
and better jobs does not necessarily happen in each 
and every case. OPIC needs to adopt a new mea-
surement standard both to identify foreign invest-
ment projects that leave workers and communities 
better off if the projects come to fruition than could 
be expected if the outward investment did not take 
place and also to separate these out from foreign 
investment projects that leave workers and commu-
nities worse off.
This new measurement standard will have to be 
backed by changes in OPIC statutory instructions 
The appropriate test is for OPIC to 
assess whether US workers, firms, and 
communities would be better or worse off 
overall if a proposed investment project 
went ahead. This common-sense standard—
identified as a new “US net economic 
benefits” test—should be incorporated into 
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regarding what are termed “US effects.” OPIC cur-
rently examines not what the US economy would 
look like if a given investment project proceeds in 
comparison with what would happen if the invest-
ment did not occur but simply whether there might 
be  job  losses  associated  with  the  investment.  In-
deed, in recent years, OPIC has actually tightened 
its procedures to refuse to consider projects in which 
there may be any job losses at home, not simply net 
job losses at home. This is an implausible standard 
by which to test for collective benefits to the United 
States when diverse industries are simultaneously 
expanding,  contracting,  and  reconstituting  them-
selves to become more competitive. OPIC’s current 
US-effects test has led to an OPIC portfolio that is 
smaller than it could be, less development-friendly 
than  it  could  be,  and  less  supportive  of  workers 
(in  both  home  and  host  countries)  than  it  could 
be.  The  more  appropriate  test  is  for  OPIC  to  as-
sess whether US workers, firms, and communities 
would be better or worse off overall if a proposed 
investment project went ahead. This common-sense 
standard—identified  as  a  new  “US  net  economic 
benefits” test—should be incorporated into OPIC’s 
authorizing legislation.
Enlarging the Client Base and Revising Eligibil-
ity Criteria
Changes  in  OPIC’s  statutory  restraints  with 
regard to US effects along the lines outlined above 
could give access to a large pool of potential new cli-
ents, many of whom do not now even approach OPIC 
for support. A more “proactive” approach to market-
ing OPIC’s services would be greatly enhanced by 
targeting,  at  the  same  time,  small  and  medium-
sized  firms  that  find  themselves  at  the  point  of 
moving from sending exports overseas to developing 
marketing and assembly operations abroad. To ac-
complish this, there is no need for OPIC to build 
up a vast new bureaucracy. Instead, the already-
functioning infrastructure of the US Foreign Com-
mercial Service, the US Export Assistance Centers, 
and the US Export-Import Bank—together with the 
Small Business Administration and with state and 
municipal  business  support  services—can  help 
identify firms ready to step up from exports to direct 
investment. Helping small and medium-sized firms 
to become investors would at the same time help at-
tenuate the problem of adverse selection by promot-
ing greater diversification for OPIC.
To complete the renovation needed in marketing 
OPIC’s services, so as to maximize its contribution 
to the strength and vitality of the US home market, 
requires changing OPIC’s eligibility criteria to allow 
participation by foreign-owned corporations with a 
substantial base in the United States. The United 
States  is  now  the  world’s  largest  host  for  foreign 
multinational companies. Leading industries in the 
US economy find affiliates of non-US companies ac-
counting for between 20 and 30 percent of all jobs in 
the industry. The US Export-Import Bank and other 
export promotion agencies have already recognized 
the benefits of assisting non-US firms to move into 
international markets using resources from within 
the US economy.
Given this situation, it is time for OPIC’s statutes 
to be changed to permit it to support foreign-owned 
firms with a “significant US presence,” defined as 
employing 250 or more, or 500 or more, workers 
in the US economy. This will allow foreign-owned 
firms to use US workers and suppliers as a platform 
to provide for their external operations rather than 
having  to  turn  elsewhere  for  support.  This  prin-
ciple is already established in the US Government 
Advocacy Guidelines, which deem support for for-
eign-owned, US-incorporated firms to be in the US 
national interest to the extent that these firms use 
US materials and equipment, employ US labor, con-
tribute to the US technology base, and/or repatriate 
profits to the US economy.
Monitoring  Workers’  Rights,  Environmental 
Standards, and Anticorruption Provisions
OPIC has extensive internal procedures to as-
sess compliance with core labor standards, sound 
environmental practices, and anticorruption provi-
sions in the projects it supports. Recurrent com-
plaints—including allegations of serious abuses of 
workers’ and human rights and of environmental 
standards, and corrupt practices in OPIC-support-
ed projects—nonetheless persist.
Do OPIC procedures ensure that investors ob-
serve core labor standards, engage in sound envi-
ronmental practices, and avoid corrupt practices—
weeding out projects that do not, and punishing (or 
correcting) instances where OPIC-backed firms or 
their subcontractors are found to be in violation? A 
Helping small and medium-sized firms 
to become investors would at the same 
time help attenuate the problem of 
adverse selection by promoting greater 
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privileged look at various individual OPIC projects—
under  the  constraints  of  an  OPIC  confidentiality 
agreement—shows that OPIC sends its own person-
nel to sites where workers’ rights violations are most 
likely to be found, including among contractors and 
subcontractors  during  the  construction  phase  of 
OPIC-supported investments.
In  some  cases,  OPIC  has  used  internation-
ally  recognized  local  monitors  to  help  investigate 
abuses, leading to remediation plans that have in-
cluded training in occupational health and safety, 
instruction  in  local  legal  rights  by  independent 
experts, and compensation for workers improperly 
fired when, for example, they have formed a legally 
recognized union. OPIC and host-country auditors 
have then monitored the implementation of these 
remediation plans, backed by default provisions in 
OPIC contracts in case the promised remediation is 
not carried out.
But  where  do  these  worker-friendly  cases  fit 
within the universe of OPIC-backed projects? What 
provisions are there for outside observers to track 
changes or improvements made at sites where there 
are prominent allegations of workers’ and human 
rights abuses?
OPIC’s practice has been to treat workers’ rights 
cases as “business confidential,” avoiding all pub-
licity and requiring its auditors to sign and respect 
confidentiality agreements, in the hope that this will 
depoliticize such actions. But the penalty has been 
a lack of transparency in OPIC projects compared 
to some companies operating on the frontiers of the 
branded  retail  industry,  where  full,  independent 
monitoring and disclosure of working conditions is 
becoming the norm. Therefore, OPIC should bring 
itself into conformity with the best practices of the 
international  business  community  or  at  least  en-
sure that its practices compare favorably to those 
of other public- and private-sector financial services 
companies.
Similarly, an inside look at OPIC’s environmental 
monitoring provides some reassurance. In certain 
instances, OPIC has been able to stimulate US com-
panies  to  develop  new  environmental  procedures, 
which the companies then follow in OPIC-sponsored 
projects and elsewhere. In other instances—for ex-
ample, where host countries exhibit vague and in-
effective regulatory regimes to govern ambient air 
quality  or  wastewater  treatment—OPIC-supported 
projects have sometimes developed model practices 
that have subsequently become the industry stan-
dard in the host country.
But how representative are these environmental-
ly friendly cases? How can outside observers track 
problematic  investments?  OPIC  needs  to  devote 
more of its resources to informing local populations 
about environmentally sensitive project proposals, 
soliciting input from them, and using its Web site 
to allow external parties to track assessments. To 
complement  this  push  for  greater  transparency, 
OPIC must make its environmental rejection criteria 
more explicit to the greatest extent possible, without 
violating the Trade Secrets Act, a criminal statute 
with a chilling effect on public officials’ willingness 
to disclose information that could negatively impact 
a company’s financial performance.
OPIC now renders private informal assessments 
of whether proposed projects meet its environmen-
tal standards before the formal application process 
so as to avoid public disclosures that might jeopar-
dize external funding for the projects that fail. But 
if a project does not meet OPIC’s standards—and 
its sponsors cannot or will not bring it up to OPIC’s 
requirements—this  fact,  although  not  necessarily 
the identity of the sponsors, should be made public, 
if for no other reason than to enhance OPIC’s cred-
ibility, along with the salutary effect of signaling the 
market that certain types of project impacts carry 
unacceptable environmental or social risks.
With regard to bribery and corruption, all OPIC 
insurance  contracts  and  finance  agreements  re-
quire  that  the  project  company  comply  with  the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and with all 
similar local laws. A violation of these laws entitles 
OPIC to terminate the insurance contract or declare 
the borrower in default. Any OPIC-backed investor 
or borrower is liable for any bribery or corruption 
committed by any “agent” operating on its behalf. 
OPIC  is  required  to  suspend  any  entity  guilty  of 
violating FCPA from access to loans, insurance, or 
guarantees for up to five years.
Under FCPA, guilt or innocence must be deter-
mined by a US court. The US Department of Justice 
is responsible for criminal investigation and pros-
ecution. OPIC reports that it investigates accusa-
OPIC should bring itself into conformity 
with the best practices of the international 
business community or at least ensure that 
its practices compare favorably to those of 
other public- and private-sector financial 
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tions appearing in the press (and elsewhere) about 
the projects it backs, and it refers all credible allega-
tions to the Department of Justice.
In more than 30 years, however, OPIC has made 
such a referral just once, in the Enron-Dabhol case 
in India in 2002. Given the large number of allega-
tions that have arisen in the infrastructure, oil, gas, 
and mining sectors where much of its business lies, 
it would seem evident that the Corporation should 
become more vigilant in its monitoring and, when 
justified, more disposed to turn over cases to the 
Justice  Department.  In  contrast  to  the  greater 
transparency in reporting monitoring results with 
regard to workers’ rights and environmental prac-
tices recommended above, however, the presump-
tion  of  innocence  in  criminal  proceedings  limits 
OPIC’s ability to make adverse assessments about 
FCPA allegations public.
The  above  recommendations  about  how  OPIC 
can strengthen its procedures to ensure compliance 
with  environmental,  workers’  rights,  and  anticor-
ruption practices will unavoidably provoke concern, 
however, at the opposite end of the spectrum. That 
is, to what extent might such OPIC reforms with 
regard to monitoring and transparency become too 
onerous for clients that are already urging OPIC to 
cut back on burdensome requirements?
Streamlining OPIC’s Operations
In  light  of  complaints  about  slow  service  and 
arduous  reporting  requirements,  OPIC  has  made 
efforts to speed the time cycle for consideration and 
approval of its projects. These efforts have involved 
pushing approval authority down to the vice presi-
dential  level  and  below  and  requiring  fewer  deci-
sions at the level of OPIC’s Investment Committee. 
All OPIC departments now feature a single point of 
contact for clients, and they have created a pipeline 
tracking system to trace projects and expedite the 
clearance process.
But the term streamlining often masks conflicts 
among objectives. It is admittedly difficult to rec-
oncile  the  contention  that  OPIC’s  procedures  for 
monitoring environmental and workers’ rights are 
already too onerous and drive away investors with 
the proposal that OPIC needs to expand disclosure 
and  facilitate  external  observation  of  whether  its 
standards are being met.
There is no way to avoid ongoing debate about 
which approach will allow OPIC to fulfill its develop-
mental mission more effectively. But the trade-offs 
may be less severe than might be supposed, if OPIC 
replicates international industry best practices with 
regard to transparency on issues of environmental 
and workers’ rights. The result should be to push its 
clients toward the cutting edge of credible and work-
able monitoring and remediation, without invoking 
the criminal penalties of the Trade Secrets Act.
Of particular note, however, is the fact that OP-
IC’s current legislated mandates often make it more 
difficult  for  the  Corporation  to  respond  promptly 
to humanitarian or foreign policy crises. However, 
OPIC’s record in Central America and the Caribbe-
an, following the natural disasters of the 1980s and 
1990s; Eastern and Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, following the end of the Cold War; Af-
rica in the context of the Millennium Challenge; and 
Central Asia in the wake of September 11, suggests 
that OPIC is usually able to quickly mobilize invest-
ment to respond to urgent foreign policy initiatives.
Lessons Learned from Recent Crises
The presentation of actual or potential claims 
associated with the MidAmerican case in Indonesia 
in 1999, and with the Enron-Dabhol case in India 
in 2002, raises new questions—broader than what 
may be associated with these individual projects—
for a political risk insurance agency such as OPIC. 
So also may the experiences of Argentina and Brazil 
in 2001–02.
These crises should prompt OPIC to reevaluate 
how  to  prepare  for  project  difficulties  that  spring 
from cross-border economic contagion rather than 
OPIC’s current legislated mandates often 
make it more difficult for the Corporation 
to respond promptly to humanitarian or 
foreign policy crises.
Recent crises should prompt OPIC to 
reevaluate how to prepare for project 
difficulties that spring from cross-border 
economic contagion rather than from 
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from deliberate host-country misbehavior. The cri-
ses also should spur OPIC to find out how to sepa-
rate genuine political risk from more general com-
mercial risk during a regional economic downturn, 
so that its reserves do not end up being expended 
simply to compensate for the onset of recession.
The  claims  experience  in  these  crises  might 
provoke OPIC to look more closely at the terms and 
conditions of foreign investment agreements to de-
termine  whether  they  are  excessive  or  imprudent 
in what they demand of host authorities. And the 
Argentine experience should force political risk in-
surers and investors alike to reevaluate whether the 
waiting periods on inconvertibility insurance are so 
long that the policies effectively lock the purchaser 
into exposure to a potentially huge devaluation.
OPIC Funds
OPIC’s  investment  funds  program  provides 
loans  to  independent  fund  managers,  who  then 
raise equity capital in private markets and deploy 
the combined capital to a number of small projects 
in a given country or region. OPIC-supported funds 
have invested almost $2 billion in more than 200 
firms in over 40 countries. Although fund manag-
ers make their own decisions about which projects 
to back, they are required to bring each proposed 
project to OPIC to ensure that it meets statutory 
requirements. This funds program has been struc-
tured to allow fund managers to use public mon-
ies,  with  OPIC  absorbing  high  risk  but  receiving 
incommensurately lower rewards, whereas private 
partners have been able to enjoy potentially large 
rewards with proportionally lower risk.
OPIC  has  restructured  the  investment  funds 
program along lines—only recently implemented—
in  which  OPIC  puts  up  a  much  lower  proportion 
of  the  total  capital,  relying  on  the  fund  manager 
and partners to ante up more of their own money, 
while reserving for itself a larger percentage of the 
upside  returns  from  successful  funds.  OPIC  has 
also implemented a more competitive and transpar-
ent  selection  process  for  fund  managers  and  has 
undertaken extensive work to document the devel-
opmental benefits of fund subprojects. The goal is 
to give OPIC an equity-like return when it takes an 
equity-like risk and to reduce the likelihood that a 
catastrophic loss from one fund could not be offset 
by profits from other funds.
Whether private fund managers can raise capi-
tal for deployment in riskier regions with less lever-
age provided from OPIC resources is a question that 
only the market can answer. If the answer is nega-
tive, OPIC’s ability to stimulate investment in less 
developed countries may decline.
A Summing Up
The analysis presented here points to a small 
but crucial number of reforms and midcourse cor-
rections that can prepare OPIC to make a substan-
tially greater contribution to the growth of develop-
ing  countries  while  simultaneously  enhancing  its 
contribution  to  US  development  (and  thus  broad 
foreign policy and humanitarian) goals, and its posi-
tive impact on workers, firms, and communities in 
the US home economy. This new OPIC will be able to 
play a much larger—and more transparent—role in 
ensuring that fundamental workers’ rights, environ-
mental  standards,  and  anticorruption  provisions 
are observed and strengthened throughout emerg-
ing markets. Looking to the future, through reform, 
OPIC will become thoroughly capable of withstand-
ing rigorous scrutiny as a US-government-backed 
agency  that  complements  and  leverages  vigorous 
private-sector activity around the world in the pro-
motion  of  economic  and  social  development,  and 
thus of greater world prosperity and stability.
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